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In this paper we assess the impact of abolishing biofuel policies (mandates, tax credits, import and
export tariffs) on agricultural price levels and price variability as well as some aspects related to global
food security. For the analysis we employ a recursive-dynamic agricultural multi-commodity model
within a stochastic framework. Results of the 10-years forward looking scenario indicate that the
removal of biofuel policies would have a significant effect on price variability of biofuels, but only a
marginal impact on the variability of agricultural commodity prices. Without biofuel policies, global
biofuel demand would decrease by 25% for ethanol and 32% for biodiesel. Moreover, prices would only
moderately decrease for ethanol feedstock commodities like wheat and coarse grains, while prices for
biodiesel feedstock commodities, specifically vegetable oils, would be more affected. Due to competing
uses of crop production such as feed and industrial use, abolishing biofuel policies would not necessar-
ily lead to an increase in global food security, as food use increases would remain low for most crops
and regions.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ailability
imports),Introduction
The food price crisis in 2008 entailed the rise and subse-
quent fall in agricultural food prices, and lead to a wide range
of studies devoted to understanding drivers of high prices and
increased price variability in agricultural markets. Regarding
the drivers, researchers come to different conclusions on the
relative importance of the underlying causes, but there is a gen-
eral consensus that biofuel policies are one of the culprits along
with a combination of factors, comprising harvest failures in
various parts of the world, subsequent export restrictions or
bans for some agricultural commodities by several countries,
increasing crude oil prices, slowing down of crop yield trends,
global stock declines of several agricultural commodities in
the years preceding the price peak, increasing investment in
commodity funds and related financial speculation, decreasing
economic growth, and the depreciation of the US dollar (see
e.g. Headey and Fan, 2008; Trostle, 2008; Baffes and Haniotis,
2010; Gilbert, 2010; Naylor and Falcon, 2010; FAO et al.,
2011a; Tadesse et al., 2014). Due to their potentially harmful
effects for consumers and producers, high prices and increased
price variability in agricultural markets brought the topic offood security1 back to the top of the international policy agenda
(FAO, 2009, 2010; FAO et al., 2011a,b).
As mentioned above, biofuel policies are considered as one of
the potential drivers for both high prices and increased price vari-
ability in agricultural markets. Global biofuels production has
grown fundamentally over the last ten years. In the period 2005–
2010 the world production of ethanol increased from 46 to 101 bil-
lion litres and biodiesel production grew from 3.7 to 20 billion
litres. The increase in biofuels production has continued also over
the last five years, and by 2014 ethanol production has reached
about 114 billion litres and biodiesel production about 30 billion
litres (OECD-FAO, 2015). The rise in biofuels production has sub-
stantially been stimulated by specific biofuel policies, which have
been implemented by several countries, such as the US, European
Union (EU), Brazil, Argentina and Australia, with the aim to favour
the use of biofuels, primarily in order to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and dependency on fossil fuels (OECD, 2008). There is
a wide array of policy measures to promote biofuels, but the threeprices),
hether a
Pinstrup-
ffect the
2 The results of any analysis based on the use of the Aglink-Cosimo model by
parties outside the OECD are outside the responsibility of the OECD Secretariat.
Conclusions derived by third-party users of Aglink-Cosimo should not be attributed to
the OECD or its member governments.
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biofuels are tax credits (concessions), blending or use mandates
and trade restrictions (OECD, 2008; Blanco et al., 2010; Sorda
et al., 2010). Tax credits provide tax concessions to biofuel produc-
ers (refineries) or users. Tax credits do not create an obligation to
produce or consume certain quantities of biofuels, but they make
biofuel more price-competitive with fossil fuels, and hence consti-
tute incentives for the consumption of biofuels. Their effectiveness
depends not only on the amount of the tax credit, but also on the
relative competitiveness of fuels on the market (OECD, 2008;
CBO, 2010; Rajcaniova et al., 2013). Blending or use mandates
operate in a different way. As they require biofuels to represent a
certain minimum quantity or share in the transport fuel market,
they can potentially create an obligation to consume or produce.
For example, the biofuel mandate in the USA is a fixed quantity,
which sets a minimum consumption; it is considered to be binding
if markets would have consumption below the mandate in its
absence. In the EU, the obligation is to reach a specific share of
the transport fuel consumption. Thus there is a co-movement
between fossil and biofuels demand. This adds an upward pressure
on the price of biofuels, which will tend to be above the price level
they would reach in the absence of the mandate. Other factors like
production costs and imports might help to reduce the pressure,
but production costs in the EU are higher than in other regions of
the world and the EU imposes preferential tariffs to biodiesel
imports, which makes it more likely that biofuel mandates in the
EU result in a binding mandate (OECD, 2008; de Gorter and Just,
2009; Ziolkowska et al., 2010; Rajcaniova et al., 2013). Biofuels
related trade restrictions come mainly in the form of import tariffs.
Import tariffs may be designed to protect a less competitive
domestic fuel industry from foreign lower-cost biofuel suppliers,
resulting in higher domestic biofuel prices and restrained develop-
ment perspectives for more competitive foreign suppliers (OECD,
2008; Janda et al., 2012).
That biofuel markets are indeed quite policy-dependant can
already be observed via the close link between current develop-
ments on the biofuel markets and the policies enforced (EC,
2014; OECD-FAO, 2015). One example of the policy dependency
can be found in the European Union, where the present Renewable
Energy Directive (RED) is due to be replaced in 2020 (Council of the
European Union, 2009). Currently it is not yet decided what will be
the EU biofuels policy after 2020, and this uncertainty about the
future development in the EU biofuels policy is directly reflected
in both a lack of investment in biofuels production, such that the
fulfilment of the present mandates is not achieved, and an ongoing
debate concerning the sustainability of first generation biofuels
(OECD-FAO, 2015). Another example for the policy dependency
can be observed in the US, where the future development of biofu-
els is driven by assumptions on decisions taken by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (OECD-FAO, 2015).
The analysis of the impact of biofuels on agricultural market
developments and related price levels and variability commonly
draws on either econometric approaches (time-series analysis) or
the use of economic partial or general equilibrium models. Time-
series analysis relies on the estimation of several parameters for
which a relative large number of available observations is needed.
Furthermore, the analysis based on time series makes use of prices
and other variables like macroeconomic indicators, which are
recorded by several organisations and are therefore easily accessi-
ble. An overview of agricultural price volatility analysis is given in
Brümmer et al. (2013). Serra and Zilberman (2013) present an
extensive review of time-series literature analysing the impacts
of biofuels on agricultural commodity prices. Most of the reviewed
time-series based literature concludes that biofuel and crude oil
prices drive agricultural price levels and that price volatility in
energy markets is transferred to agricultural markets (see Serraand Zilberman, 2013, and the reviewed literature). A general limi-
tation of the studies done with time-series is that they mainly
focus on the empirical analysis of price links without imposing a
theoretical structure. While they are very relevant and powerful
in characterising price behaviour, in many cases their analysis is
limited to few variables, and therefore the interactions of different
market fundamentals cannot be fully explored (de Gorter et al.,
2013).
There is also a wide range of economic modelling studies
assessing the impact of biofuels on agricultural markets, especially
regarding price levels. A review on economic modelling studies
assessing the impact of biofuels on agricultural markets is given
in Zhang et al. (2013). In general, this studies all project upward
trends in both agricultural commodity production and prices due
to biofuel policies (see Zhang et al., 2013 and the reviewed litera-
ture). While economic modelling is widely used to analyse devel-
opments of production and price levels, it is generally less used
in studies related to price variability, as the latter requires the
use of stochastics. Two examples for the latter are the work done
by Taya (2012), who assesses price volatility with the Aglink–
Cosimo model by means of yield shocks, and Artavia et al. (2014)
who, in addition to yield shocks, also include macroeconomic
uncertainty in their analysis. Some other studies with equilibrium
modelling approaches, such as McPhail and Babcock (2008, 2012),
Hennessy (1998), and Debnath et al. (2014), aimed, rather than to
solely study price variation, at understanding how different levels
of uncertainty might affect the linkages among market determi-
nants and the policies regulating these markets. The use of eco-
nomic models is especially useful in the sense that it can
represent specific shocks and evaluate the price movements result-
ing from that specific shock.
Against this background the purpose of this paper is to comple-
ment the existing literature, by quantitatively assessing the poten-
tial future impact of biofuel policies on both agricultural price
levels and price variability as well as its effect on global food secu-
rity. For the analysis we employ the Aglink–Cosimo model with its
partial stochastic analysis framework. The remainder of the paper
is organised as follows. Section ‘Modelling approach and scenario
setting’ describes the Aglink–Cosimo model and the underlying
assumptions of the simulated scenarios. Section ‘Analysis of the
scenario results’ reports and analyses the scenario results with
regard to changes in commodity balances, market prices and
related effects on food security. Section ‘Main findings and con-
cluding remarks’ concludes the paper.Modelling approach and scenario setting
Aglink–Cosimo is a global economic model covering the main
agricultural traded commodities. The model was developed by
the OECD and FAO Secretariats,2 with the purpose of preparing
medium-term agricultural market projections by integrating market
expertise from national agencies and market experts (i.e. what is
usually called the ‘Outlook exercise’). Moreover, the model provides
a consistent quantitative framework for counterfactual policy analy-
sis. Currently, this Outlook work is performed on an annual basis in
the form of an OECD-FAO joint publication and serves as a reference
for policy making (OECD, 2007; Himics et al., 2014; OECD-FAO,
2015). A similar exercise is carried out at EU level, on the basis of
the EU module of the Aglink–Cosimo model (EC, 2014; Araujo
Encisco et al., 2015).
3 It has to be noted, that China has no biofuels mandate or other policy aiming at
promoting the use of biofuels. Therefore, despite its high consumption of ethanol,
China is not included in the scenario assumptions.
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tries in the world, main crops and agricultural outputs as well as
agricultural and trade policies relevant for agricultural markets.
Country-specific information on relevant policies is updated annu-
ally, which allows for short to medium term analysis of agricultural
market developments. Supply, demand, trade and prices of the
main agricultural commodities are endogenously calculated for
each of the countries and regions represented in the model. The
model uses exogenous assumptions on the development of
macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth rates, inflation,
exchange rates, world crude oil prices and population growth.
Price–demand and supply elasticities are revised regularly by the
OECD and FAO model teams (OECD, 2007; OECD-FAO, 2015).
Aglink–Cosimo covers production of first and second generation
biofuels globally and specific biofuel policies (e.g. biofuel man-
dates, import tariffs, tax credits, import and export tariffs) disag-
gregated by region and type of biofuels for the major producers
(see e.g. OECD, 2008; Blanco et al., 2010).
Different authors have carried out analysis with Aglink–Cosimo
to assess the impact of biofuels on agricultural markets. For
instance Burrell et al. (2012) analysed the effects of biofuels on
land use, highlighting the impact of the EU biofuel policy on land
use and land use change. Other authors, such as Hélaine et al.
(2013) and Davies (2012), focused on price effects, concluding that
policies aiming at promoting biofuels production result in an
increased production of some agricultural commodities, with veg-
etable oils being the most affected in the EU. As for studies aimed
at analysing the link between biofuels and price volatility with
Aglink–Cosimo, Durham et al. (2012) explored the effect of flexible
biofuel mandates in the time of price spikes, deducting that these
types of mandates could help mitigate price increases. These stud-
ies rely on ad-hoc scenarios, which are based on specific market
shocks to demonstrate how such shocks could alter the projected
development of agricultural markets.
Starting in 2011, Aglink–Cosimo includes features that enable
partial stochastic (uncertainty) analysis. With these features, the
uncertainty around main market drivers enters as shocks in the
simulations and it is possible to analyse and understand alternative
developments of agricultural markets, including price variation
(Nii-Naate, 2011; Burrell and Nii-Naate, 2013; Artavia et al.,
2014). Our study is different from the previous biofuel studies
mentioned above, especially because it makes use of a partial
stochastic analysis framework to assess the impact of a removal
of biofuel policies on absolute price levels and price variability of
agricultural commodities, as well as on global food security.
As pointed out by Burrell and Nii-Naate (2013), the stochastic
analysis is partial, in the sense that it does not cover all the sources
of uncertainty. It only includes the past uncertainty in crop yields,
macroeconomic indicators and crude oil price. The past develop-
ment of yields is taken into account as from 1996. The yield crops
treated stochastically include coarse grains (maize, barley, oats and
other cereals), wheat (durum and soft wheat varieties), rice, oil-
seeds (soybean, sunflower seed and rapeseed) and palm oil. In
order to reflect the variability of grassland productivity, milk yield
variability is also taken into account. The regions covered are North
America (Canada. Mexico and US), South America (Argentina, Bra-
zil, Paraguay and Uruguay), European Union (EU-15 and New
Member States), Black Sea Region (Kazakhstan, Russian Federation
and Ukraine), China, India, South East Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia
and Thailand) and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). It should
be noted that not all the crops are treated as stochastically in every
region. Appendix C provides a table summarising the crops for
which uncertainty is included by region. For the macroeconomic
and crude oil price uncertainty, the stochastic variables are Gross
Domestic Product Index (GDPI), Gross Domestic Product Deflator
(GDPD), Consumer Price Index (CPI), Exchange Rate with respectto the US dollar (XR) and World Oil Price. The historical data used
for calculating macroeconomic indicators and oil price past uncer-
tainty starts in 2003. As in the case of yields, macroeconomic
uncertainty is limited to specific countries that dominate agricul-
tural markets, namely OECD and BRIC countries.
For this paper, we employ the latest version of the Aglink–
Cosimo model, which corresponds to the baseline projection for
the period 2015–2024 (OECD-FAO, 2015). Compared with the
previous baseline 2014–2023, the new projections reflect a gener-
ally more conservative view on the development of biofuels. The
yearly growth rate in biofuel production and consumption for the
10-year projection period 2015–2024 is around 2% at world level,
with the US, Brazil and the EU being the major producers and
consumers over the baseline period (Table 1), and some limited
expansion of biofuels in other markets. This restrained biofuels
development is partly driven by a lower level of crude oil prices
than expected in previous baselines, which in nominal terms
has an annual growth rate of 3.7%, going from 64 USD per barrel
in 2015 to 88 USD per barrel in 2024 (cf. latest assumptions in
OECD-FAO, 2015).
Contrary to other commodities, biofuels trade is marginal com-
pared to production and consumption levels. At the end of the
baseline period, the biofuel trade share is projected to be less than
5% of global consumption, mainly because of the high tariffs
imposed to biofuel imports by some countries (e.g. the EU), but
also because countries mostly trade feedstock which are further
processed domestically. Biodiesel production and consumption is
largely dominated by the EU, which imports vegetable oils for bio-
diesel production. Other large biodiesel producers such as the US,
Argentina, Brazil and Indonesia, base their production on domestic
oilseed oils and palm oil. Ethanol production is projected to be lar-
gely dominated by the US and Brazil, both markets staying close to
autarchy (i.e. with Brazil and the US as net exporter). Other large
ethanol producers are China, the EU and India, but from those only
the EU has sizeable imports, which are projected to be around 15%
of the domestic demand (OECD-FAO, 2015).
Overall, as mentioned above, biofuel markets are heavily pol-
icy driven. Different types of instruments such as blending
mandates, tax credits, import and export tariffs, play a signifi-
cant role in enhancing production, consumption and protecting
domestic markets. In order to assess the possible impacts of a
world-wide removal of biofuel policies, we use two scenarios:
a ‘reference scenario’ (REF) which corresponds to the OECD-
FAO (2015–2024) baseline and a ‘No biofuel policy scenario’
(NBP) that relies on the same assumptions as the reference sce-
nario but where biofuel mandates, biofuel tax credits and biofu-
els import and export tariffs are removed. In the NBP scenario,
biodiesel and ethanol related policies are removed in the top
five biofuels consuming regions for the entire projection period
2015–2024, which covers about 84% and 87% of world biodiesel
and ethanol consumption, respectively (see Table 1).3 Table 2
presents the biofuel policy assumptions of both scenarios in
2024.
The REF and NBP scenario are both simulated about 1000 times
with the same set of exogenous shocks in the uncertainty analysis
(see Appendix A). In order to exclude possible outliers which could
potentially bias the results, we only account for observations
which are within the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile. A similar
approach has been the standard way of presenting results of previ-
ous uncertainty analyses (EC, 2012, 2013, 2014), although on the
basis of a more reduced inter-percentile range.
Table 1
World consumption shares for the top five biofuels consuming regions (projection
year 2024).
Biodiesel Ethanol
Region Share
(%)
Region Share
(%)
EU 35 US 41
US 17 Brazil 29
Indonesia 15 EU 8
Brazil 13 China 7
Argentina 4 Indiaa 2
Accumulated share of the
top five consuming
regions
84 Accumulated share of the
top five consuming regions
87
a The fifth largest ethanol consumer is Canada and India is the sixth. We decided
to include India instead of Canada because India is one of the largest sugar pro-
ducers and we are interested in exploring also the potential relationships between
the sugar and ethanol markets.
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In this section we present the most important scenario results
regarding prices, demand, supply and net trade in ethanol, biodie-
sel and agricultural commodities in selected regions. As main indi-
cator for assessing the impact of uncertainty on a particular
variable we use the inter-percentile coefficient of variation4 in
the year 2024 (CV2024) between the 2.5th and the 97.5th percentile.Ethanol markets
When comparing the coefficients of variation for crude oil and
biofuels in both the REF and NBP scenarios (see Fig. 1), results indi-
cate that not all the uncertainty from oil prices is transmitted to
the ethanol world markets. The coefficient of variation in 2024
(CV2024) for the oil price is 35.9%, and is greater than the variation
for regional ethanol prices in both the REF and NBP scenario. It is
important to note that here stockholding serves as a buffer to alle-
viate the impact of oil shocks on production and consumption due
to fossil fuel consumption patterns, cost of inputs and other costs.
When comparing the variation of prices between the REF and
the NBP scenarios, it can be seen that for all regions more price
variation is observed for ethanol in the NBP scenario. This is
because biofuel blending mandates link the consumption of etha-
nol to the consumption of gasoline, which in turn makes the con-
sumption of biofuels less elastic and, consequently, less reactive
to market shocks. After the removal of the biofuel policies, price
variation increases homogenously in the world, i.e. US, Brazil and
India show CVs around 19%. This suggests that in the NBP scenario,
ethanol price variability converges as the markets are more inte-
grated. The exception is the EU ethanol market, where the price
variation remains well below the world levels despite increasing
from 10% to 13%.
Concerning the effect on ethanol price levels, prices in the
world, US, and Brazil decrease on average by 10 USD/hL in the
NBP scenario. Although the mandate is not strongly binding in
these regions, its removal negatively affects consumption. More-
over, in the absence of tax credits, ethanol prices move closer to
gasoline prices. In India, ethanol prices decrease by 13 USD/hL,
but rather than an effect of the missing mandate this is an outcome
of India being better integrated in the world markets. The largest
price level change is in the EU, dropping by 39 USD/hL, i.e. from
82 to 43 USD/hL. This drop is similar to the 38 USD/hL of tax credits
we removed in the NBP scenario, which clearly shows that the4 The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean.biofuel measures enforced in the EU drive the domestic price to a
higher level than the world price, actually more than in any other
region.
In order to assess whether there is a statistically significant dif-
ference between prices in both scenarios, a Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test has been done (Appendix B). Results suggest that ethanol
prices in all the markets are statistically different in the two sce-
narios, which confirms that biofuel policies affect the price and
the price variation levels.
After biofuel policies are removed, ethanol supply, consumption
and trade balances adjust to a new equilibrium. Table 3 shows
regional markets balances for ethanol, allowing for a quick assess-
ment of potentially distortive effects of biofuel policies across the
world.
Globally, ethanol demand decreases by around 25% in the NBP
scenario (from 134 to 102 billion litres). However, the effects can
substantially differ between regions. For instance, in the US con-
sumption drops around 22% after removing the mandate and bio-
fuel tax credits, whereas production decreases by 28%.
Consequently, the US becomes a net importer of ethanol. This indi-
cates that in the absence of biofuel policies and trade barriers,
competitive markets such as sugar cane-based ethanol from Brazil
would gain market share in the US.
The market balance in Brazil is affected in different ways. First,
the absence of tax credits makes national ethanol production less
attractive (24%). Second, without the blending mandate national
consumption is projected to rapidly decrease (45%). Third, the
removal of ad valorem tariffs in other countries would allow Brazil
to take full advantage of its competitive sugar cane-based ethanol
on the international market, replacing US maize-based ethanol,
leading to an increase of exports by 7 billion litres compared to
the reference scenario.
The shifts in the trade balances of Brazil and US might be read
as an indicator of market integration. By contrast, the EU seems
to become less integrated, as ethanol trade declines to only 25%
of the REF scenario (with net imports decreasing from 1.6 to
0.39 billion litres). This reflects the fact that the EU mandate is
strongly driving the consumption of ethanol either by means of
domestic supply or imports. EU consumption is projected to
decrease by 38% and production by 31% in the NBP scenario. Since
the EU ethanol price remains well below the world price in the NBP
scenario, even without import tariffs, the EU would remain a small
net importer of ethanol, in part because the major potential expor-
ter (Brazil) is geographically distant (i.e. high transport costs), but
more importantly because consumption decreases faster than
production.
Looking at the coefficients of variation attached to the market
balances, we can see that results are in line with the impacts on
price levels discussed above. In the REF scenario, the biofuel poli-
cies drive ethanol supply and demand, such that uncertainty is
lower than in the NBP scenario. In the case of the US, supply and
demand variation doubles in the NBP scenario, mainly because
the removal of the ethanol blending mandate. As for Brazil, the
demand remains with similar levels of variation in both scenarios,
while supply increases.
We should stress that in the NBP scenario the variation of con-
sumption (13.3%) is larger than supply variation (4.1%) in the US,
while in Brazil it is the opposite, variation of supply (13.6%) is lar-
ger than demand variation (4.6%). Moreover, demand and supply
variation in the US and Brazil respectively are very similar. The
conclusion we can derive is that an increase of trade between these
two regions leads to similar levels of variation in the demand of the
importing region and the supply of the exporting region. In addi-
tion, variation is large in these market variables because they are
affected by the exchange rate, which is a very important source
of uncertainty when export shares are large.
Table 2
Scenario assumptions on biofuel policies (2024).
Region Policy REF scenario NBP scenario
(values for 2024) (values for 2024)
EU Mandate for biofuels 7% (21,356 MnL) 0% (0 MnL)
Ethanol tariff ad valorem equivalent 36.60% 0.00%
Ethanol Tax 42 (Euro per hL) 90 (Euro per hL)
Gasoline Tax 90 (Euro per hL) 90 (Euro per hL)
Biodiesel tariff ad valorem equivalent 6.50% 0.00%
Biodiesel Tax 45 (Euro per hL) 70 (Euro per hL)
Diesel Tax 70 (Euro per hL) 70 (Euro per hL)
US Renewable Fuel Standards Total 58,835 MnL 0 MnL
Renewable Fuel Standards Cellulosic 1285 MnL 0 MnL
Renewable Fuel Standards Other Advanced 256 MnL 0 MnL
Renewable Fuel Standards Biodiesel 4845 MnL 0 MnL
Biodiesel tariff ad valorem equivalent 4.60% 0.00%
Biodiesel Tax Credit 0 (USD per hL) 0 (USD per hL)
Ethanol tariff ad valorem equivalent 2.50% 0.00%
Ethanol Tax Credit 0 (USD per hL) 0(USD per hL)
Brazil Ethanol Incorporation Mandate 19.85% (16,230 MnL) 0% (0 MnL)
Ethanol Tax 38.7 (BRL per hL) 101.3 (BRL per hL)
Gasoline Tax 101.3 (BRL per hL) 101.3 (BRL per hL)
Indonesia Biodiesel Blending Target 12% (5638 MnL) 0% (0 MnL)
Biodiesel tariff ad valorem equivalent 4.50% 0.00%
Argentina Biodiesel Mandate 8.4% (1257 MnL) 0% (0 MnL)
Biodiesel tariff ad valorem equivalent 6.15% 0.00%
Ethanol tariff ad valorem equivalent 1.00% 0.00%
India Share of Biodiesel Mandate in Total Fuel Consumption 1% (900 MnL) 0% (0 MnL)
Biodiesel tariff ad valorem equivalent 7.90% 0.00%
Share of Ethanol Mandate in Total Fuel Consumption 2% (780 MnL) 0% (0 MnL)
Ethanol tariff ad valorem equivalent 8.00% 0.00%
Note: MnL = million litres; hL = hectolitre.
Fig. 1. Crude oil and ethanol price levels and variation in 2024. Note: Oil price (Brent) on the left; on the right, ethanol prices for the REF scenario are shown in light blue and
in dark blue for the NBP scenario; coefficients of variation (CV2024) are displayed on the top and expressed as percentages. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 3
Ethanol: demand, supply and net exports of selected regions (year 2024; levels are in million litres).
Region Supply Demand Net Exports
Reference scenario NBP scenario Reference scenario NBP scenario Reference scenario NBP scenario
US Level 56,691 41,013 55,063 43,278 1621 2275
CV2024 2.9% 4.1% 6.5% 13.3%
Brazil Level 42,482 32,288 38,968 21,621 3514 10,666
CV2024 9.3% 13.6% 4.0% 4.6%
EU Level 9491 6562 11,074 6946 1583 385
CV2024 2.7% 6.6% 9.4% 0.6%
India Level 2317 2266 2426 2461 109 195
CV2024 1.5% 1.9% 1.5% 1.1%
World Level 134,436 102,757 134,118 102,437
CV2024 3.9% 7.2% 3.9% 7.3%
Note: Net exports = exports – imports.
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The adjustments in the biodiesel markets following a removal
of biofuel policies are less pronounced than the ones in the ethanol
markets. The removal of biodiesel policies has a moderate negative
impact on the world biodiesel price level, which drops from 95 to
91 USD/hL, while price variability increases from 23.8% to 25.5%. In
the NBP scenario, the price variation in the US and Argentina is
only marginally increased, from 23.8% to 25.5%, compared to the
REF scenario. The change is more pronounced and goes into the
opposite direction in Indonesia, where price variation decreases
from 23.1% to 18.1%. This is an outcome of removing tariffs all over
the world, as Indonesia loses share in total biodiesel exports
(Table 4), it is less exposed to shocks coming from fluctuations in
exchange rates. In the EU, the price variation remains the same
in both scenarios (around 10%).
Biodiesel prices decrease in the US from 100 to 95 USD/hL,
while they increase in Indonesia and Argentina from 90 to
93 USD/hL and 90 to 91 USD/hL, respectively. Thus, the gap
between the price for the importing region (US) and the exporting
regions (Argentina and Indonesia) is reduced, and prices converge
to the world price. This indicates that the US and Argentinean bio-
diesel markets become more integrated, the reasons are that in the
US the biodiesel production is not mandate driven, and when the
export taxes in Argentina are removed, it becomes cheaper for
the US to import biodiesel. In Indonesia, biodiesel prices remain
at world levels, with no significant changes between the REF and
NBP scenarios (see Fig. 2).
EU biodiesel markets change very drastically in the NBP sce-
nario, with the domestic biodiesel price decreasing by 39 USD/Table 4
Biodiesel: demand, supply and net exports of selected regions (year 2024; levels are in m
Region Supply Deman
Reference scenario NBP scenario Refere
EU Level 13,120 2812 13,452
CV2024 4.6% 9.1% 4.6%
US Level 4723 5156 6633
CV2024 25.8% 27.8% 22.8%
Indonesia Level 6789 4318 5638
CV2024 1.0% 34.5% 0.0%
Argentina Level 2923 3707 1429
CV2024 20.5% 20.8% 27.0%
World Level 38,569 26,523 38,297
CV2024 6.6% 14.1% 6.7%
Fig. 2. Crude oil and biodiesel price levels and variation in 2024. Note: Oil price (Brent) o
and in dark blue for the NBP scenario; coefficients of variation (CV2024) are displayed on
fixed to be equal to the mandate, thus there are no reactions. Following this limitation, Br
color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)hL (from 87 to 38 USD/hL) compared to the REF scenario, which
is explained by the combination of removing the 25 USD/hL tax
credit and the mandate. This result actually shows the effective-
ness of the support to the EU biodiesel industry by means of
increasing the domestic biodiesel price, thus making production
more attractive, while at the same time ensuring a minimum
level of consumption. Consequently, when EU biodiesel policies
are removed this leads to strong shocks on both biodiesel con-
sumption and production. First, consumption decreases strongly,
which drives biodiesel prices down drastically. Second, with low
biodiesel prices, producers cannot cover the production costs,
and they react by cutting production, with only the most compet-
itive remaining in the market. In principle, the decrease in the
price could boost consumption, but only few producers remain
such that production stays low and cannot recover. Moreover,
biodiesel producers in the EU still face rather high import tariffs
for biodiesel feedstock, preventing the imports of more affordable
raw materials, such as vegetable oils from Indonesia and
Argentina.
While the results on prices suggest that changes in the biodiesel
markets are modest, except for the EU, we tested if the difference
between the two scenarios is statistically significant. The Kol-
mogorov–Smirnov test suggests that for all regions (with the
exception of Argentina) we could reject the null hypothesis, mean-
ing that prices in both scenarios differ either in mean or variance.
Indeed, in the NBP scenario, Argentina sets the reference world
price and the remaining regions adjust to it. The case of the EU is
different, since the adjustment has more to do with the elimination
of the domestic support policies. In order to understand those dri-
vers behind price variation with and without biofuel policies inillion litres).
d Net exports
nce scenario NBP scenario Reference scenario NBP scenario
2556 332 256
0.9%
7445 1910 2289
26.4%
3738 1151 580
28.4%
1317 1494 2391
35.2%
26,252
14.3%
n the left; on the right, biodiesel prices for the REF scenario are shown in light blue
the top and expressed as percentages (Brazil biodiesel consumption in the model is
azil is excluded from this part of the analysis). (For interpretation of the references to
S.R. Araujo Enciso et al. / Food Policy 61 (2016) 9–26 15place, a closer look at the market balances and variations is neces-
sary (see Table 4).
Global supply and demand for biodiesel decreases by about 32%
in the NBP scenario. At the same time, the coefficient of variation
increases from 6.6% to 14.1% for both demand and supply balances,
with countries with higher levels of macroeconomic uncertainty
increasing their share in world markets, like for example Argen-
tina. Decreasing demand in global biodiesel markets is mainly
due to developments in the EU: as the mandate was binding the
consumption of biodiesel was set to be around 6.5% of total diesel
consumption; after the removal of the mandate consumption
shares drop to only 1.2%. This translates into EU demand decreas-
ing from about 13.5 to 2.6 billion litres, and as a consequence sup-
ply decreases from 13.1 to 2.9 billion litres.
In the EU, the variation on the supply side increases due to
the absence of policies promoting blending and consumption,
but also due to variation in crude oil prices and other macroeco-
nomic variables (i.e. economic growth and inflation). Consump-
tion and production reduces constantly over the projection
period (2015–2024), which shows how policy-driven the biodie-
sel market in the EU is. In the US, supply and demand increase
by 9% and 12%, respectively, in the NBP scenario. As the gap
between supply and demand grows, net imports increase from
1.9 to 2.3 billion litres. Thus, while all markets adjust consump-
tion downwards for biodiesel in the NBP scenario, consumption
increases in the US. This is because in both scenarios, consump-
tion levels are well above the blending target for biodiesel of
4845 million litres, i.e. the mandate in the US is not driving bio-
diesel consumption. With a non-binding mandate and the
absence of import tariffs, consumption reacts to the lower bio-
diesel prices in the NBP scenario, leading to increases in US bio-
diesel consumption. The Indonesian demand for biodiesel
decreases to 83% of the REF scenario level when biofuel policies
are removed, whereas production decreases to 63%. Variation
increases considerably for supply and demand, which is due to
the strong competition from Argentina and exchange rates’
uncertainty which Argentina transmits to world markets. Argen-
tinian biodiesel markets are constrained by the biofuel policies
enforced in the REF scenario. However, when the policies are
removed, demand and price levels remain similar. What makes
a difference for Argentina in the NBP scenario is the elimination
of export taxes, which leads to an increase in exports of 60%
(from 1.5 to 2.4 billion litres. With Argentina increasing exportsFig. 3. World crop prices spread in the REF scenario (light blue) and the NBP scenario
stochastic model outcomes within the 2.5–97.5th percentile. (For interpretation of the ref
article.)and the US increasing imports, the world market equilibrium is
mainly determined by these two countries.
Crop markets and related effects on food security
A core argument that has gained attention in the media is that
biofuels have contributed to create a more direct link between
energy and food markets by the means of linking demand for
agricultural commodities to the consumption of fossil fuels
through biofuels blending targets. In theory, increasing demand
for crops via biofuel policies puts more pressure on agricultural
commodity prices, which might not only affect price levels but
also price variation. The effect of removing biofuel policies on
both price levels and variation of agricultural commodities is
shown in Fig. 3.
Price variation does not change substantially in the NBP sce-
nario. At first glance, our results seem to challenge the findings
of McPhail and Babcock (2008), where the removal of mandates
was leading to lower levels of variation in US corn prices. However,
while McPhail and Babcock (2008) segregate the impact by using
high and low crude oil prices, such a distinction is not made in
our approach. Furthermore, while previous research was carried
out with the assumption of high crude oil prices, we currently
use the OECD-FAO (2015) baseline projections for which oil prices
are assumed to stay well below 100 USD per barrel. In addition,
McPhail and Babcock (2008) use a model focused only on the
domestic US markets, while in our analysis price formation in
world markets is covered. Last but not least, recent market devel-
opments and concerns about the sustainability of biofuel produc-
tion both in the US and EU has led to a more conservative view
on future biofuel market developments.
Scenario results show that world agricultural commodity
prices are indeed affected by biofuel policies, with higher price
levels in the reference scenario compared to the NBP scenario
(Table 5). The most affected commodities are vegetable oils, for
which prices drop by about 8% in the NBP scenario. The reason
for this drop is directly related to the removal of biodiesel blend-
ing obligations in the EU. Sugar prices decrease by almost 3%;
with most of the price drop being attributable to reduced ethanol
production in Brazil. Furthermore, the reduction of grain-based
ethanol production has an impact on wheat prices, which
decrease by 3.5%, and is even more important for coarse grains,
where prices drop by 6.1%. The reduction in wheat prices is a(dark blue) in 2024. Note: In order to remove potential outliers we only present
erences to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
Table 5
Average crop prices in the reference and NBP scenario (projection year 2024).
Commodity Reference scenario
(USD/tonne)
NBP scenario
(USD/tonne)
Change (%)
Coarse Grains 194 182 6.1
Wheat 272 262 3.5
Oilseeds 460 446 2.9
Protein Meals 411 417 1.4
Vegetable Oils 839 772 8.1
Sugar 364 353 2.9
16 S.R. Araujo Enciso et al. / Food Policy 61 (2016) 9–26consequence of the drastic decrease in ethanol production in the
EU, while reduced prices of coarse grains are due to lower corn-
based ethanol production in the US following the removal of
the mandate. Oilseeds are affected by reductions in the crushing
of rapeseed and sunflower seeds, which are used in vegetable
oil-based biodiesel production in the EU and the US. A side effect
of reducing the crushing of oilseeds is a reduction in the produc-
tion of protein meals. However, since the reduction in biofuel
production also affects the availability of distiller dried grains
(DDG) and corn gluten feed (CGF), protein meals prices are pro-
jected to increase by 1.3% when biofuel policies are removed, as
less feed stuff is available while demand from animal production
sectors remains unchanged.
With respect to global food security concerns, specifically
regarding the pillar of food access, it is generally more importantFig. 4. Change in domestic agricultural prices (in local currency) due to the abolishm
scenario; projection year 2024).to look at the price developments on domestic rather than world
markets. Therefore Fig. 4 illustrates the impact of abolishing bio-
fuel policies on the prices for major crops in countries and regions
represented in Aglink–Cosimo.
As can be seen in Fig. 4, with the removal of biofuel policies,
prices decrease in all regional markets for all groups of commodi-
ties, with the exception of protein meals. For coarse grains, regions
experiencing the largest price reductions are North and South
America, Europe, Australia and North Africa. The domestic price
reduction in the US and to a lesser extent in the EU, Ukraine and
Argentina, which are large coarse grains exporters, translate into
lower domestic prices for main importing countries of coarse
grains in the Middle East and North Africa. The highest wheat price
reductions occur in the EU and Canada, followed by other big
exporters such as the US, Argentina, CIS countries and Australia.
Since wheat exports are not dominated by one or few countries
but rather diversified, the overall price impact in exporting coun-
tries is similar to the impact in importing countries (Africa and
Latin America). In China, prices are less affected than in the rest
of the world due to policies supporting self-sufficiency, which in
turn restrict grain imports.
Price reduction for oilseeds is again particularly considerable
in the EU, driven by the excess demand of low-protein oilseeds
like rapeseed and sunflower seed. Other regions affected as well
are the Russian Federation and Australia, which are both large
exporters of rapeseed and sunflower seed. However, the impact
on the world markets is limited because most of the trade is doneent of biofuel policies (difference in percentage points compared to the reference
S.R. Araujo Enciso et al. / Food Policy 61 (2016) 9–26 17through first processing oilseed commodities, namely protein
meals and vegetable oils. Protein meals is the only commodity
group that shows a price increase over all regions in the world,
with the increase being most pronounced in the EU, followed
by Sub-Saharan countries. Important trade partners for the EU,
like Canada, US, and Argentina also experience an increase in
domestic prices following a contraction of their crushing industry.
With the exception of the US, in these regions production is
focused on rich-oil seeds, such as rapeseed and sunflower seed,
which’s production is partially driven by the biodiesel industry.
Brazil is less affected, since its biodiesel production mainly relies
on soybean oils. Vegetable oil prices are most affected in the EU,
dropping by 35%; which is mainly due to an excessive supply of
vegetable oils used for biodiesel production and not competitive
in a more integrated global market. Sugar prices decrease most
in Mexico and US, which are well integrated markets. The price
decrease is also notable in sugar exporting countries in South
Asia, Australia and Africa. The Brazilian sugar price is reacting
marginally, but small changes in this market are enough to pro-
voke adjustments in world prices.
The main conclusion that can be drawn is that prices for food
commodities indeed decrease when biofuel policies are abol-
ished. However, the impact varies significantly from region to
region. Those regions where biofuel mandates are actually in
place in the reference scenario are the ones who experience
the biggest change in domestic prices. The region most affected
is the EU, where biofuel policies strongly link the consumption
of biofuel to fossil fuel use. In principle, the drop in crop prices,
along with the reduction of using those crops for biofuel produc-
tion purposes, could translate into more affordable food for the
population and result in an increase of food security. However,
food is not the only potential use for crops, and for instance
feed, industrial use and also biofuels are important components
of the overall demand. Table 6 presents an overview of the dif-
ferent demand components in the Aglink–Cosimo model at the
world level.
As can be seen in Table 6, the scenario without biofuel policies
shows a considerable decrease in the use of grains (maize and
wheat) and vegetable oils for biofuels. However, despite this
decrease in the use for biofuels, global food use of these crops is
only marginally increasing, less than 1% for wheat and coarse
grains, and only 1.7% for vegetable oils. This is in line with previous
analyses done with the Aglink–Cosimo model which show thatTable 6
Global crop use in the reference and NBP scenarios (projection year 2024).
Commodity Use Reference Scenario
Mio tonnes Share of total use (
Coarse Grains Biofuels 152,148 10.6
Feed 850,663 59.1
Food 239,534 16.6
Industrial use and others 143,800 10.0
Wheat Biofuels 7503 1.0
Feed 148,853 19.0
Food 535,731 68.3
Industrial use and others 92,206 11.8
Oilseeds Crushing 450,554 87.4
Feed 34 0.0
Food 41,148 8.0
Industrial use and others 24,001 4.7
Protein Meals Feed 354,537 100
Vegetable Oils Biofuels 28,234 13.4
Food 168,558 80.1
Industrial use and others 13,614 6.5
Sugar Food 214,295 100large shocks in biofuel producing countries due to the removal of
biofuel policies are not immediately transmitted into large
increases in food use in developing countries (Thompson and
Pérez, 2013).
Fig. 5 illustrates the regional impact of abolishing biofuel poli-
cies on food use of major crops. As shown in Fig. 5, the removal of
biofuel mandates only leads to very marginal increases in food
use for all crops, with the exception of vegetable oils. For the lat-
ter, food use increases most in the EU, followed by Brazil, China
(the largest vegetable oil consumer) and Mexico (large vegetable
oil importer). However, neither African nor Asian countries are
benefiting from the 1.8% food use increase on the world market.
These findings suggest that only the regions where the binding
mandates are removed, along with their trading partners, will
translate the availability of vegetable oil into additional food
consumption.
Main findings and concluding remarks
In this paper we compare the projected development of agri-
cultural price levels and price variability in a standard scenario
(OECD-FAO, 2015) with a scenario were biofuel policies (man-
dates, tax credits, import and export tariffs) are removed in the
major biofuels consuming regions for the projection period
2015–2024. Our analysis generally confirms that biofuel policies
tend to bring more stability to biofuel prices in world markets
since they enforce a certain level of consumption and production
beyond no-policy profitability levels. Abolishing biofuel policies
for the major world players would imply a large negative impact
on biofuel use and production, with the adjustments being more
pronounced in those regions where the policies are more dis-
tortive. Thus, concerning the impact on biofuel prices, our find-
ings suggest that biofuel policies serve as a mechanism to
increase price levels and at the same time reduce price variability
on world markets. This is not really surprising since biofuel man-
dates provide a floor level for production and consumption, with
the consequence that general uncertainties surrounding con-
sumption and production (e.g. from variability in economic
growth or production costs) are not entirely passed through to
biofuel markets. When blending obligations are removed and tar-
iffs decreased, biofuel prices tend to fluctuate more and converge
across regions. Trade plays a major role in the adjustment of bio-
fuel world markets.NBP scenario %-change NBP vs REF scenario
%) Mio tonnes Share of total use (%)
113,526 8.0 25.4
868,878 61.1 2.1
239,959 16.9 0.2
144,662 10.2 0.6
4846 0.6 35.4
149,160 19.1 0.2
536,300 68.5 0.1
92,635 11.8 0.5
449,569 87.3 0.2
34 0.0 0.0
41,153 8.0 0.0
23,984 4.7 0.1
353,934 100 0.2
19,869 9.7 29.6
171,535 83.6 1.8
13,817 6.7 1.5
214,630 100 0.2
Fig. 5. Change in food use by crop due to the abolishment biofuel policies (%-change compared to the reference scenario, projection year 2024). Note: Protein meals are not
presented, as in the model they are only considered for feed use; Average Crops: average of all crops.
18 S.R. Araujo Enciso et al. / Food Policy 61 (2016) 9–26While price variation for biofuels will indeed be affected by a
removal of biofuel policies, the trickle-down effects to agricultural
commodity markets are somewhat limited. This confirms that bio-
fuels are not the only driver for price variation in food commodi-
ties. Other variables such as fertilizer prices, energy prices and
transport costs are directly affected by macroeconomic uncertain-
ties and may have a larger impact on price variability in agricul-
tural markets than biofuel policies.
Although variability of agricultural prices does not seem to be
strongly affected, our analysis shows that the level of agricultural
commodity prices can indeed be affected by the removal of bio-
fuel policies. The decrease in prices for most agricultural com-
modities ranges from moderate for sugar and oilseeds (2.8%) to
more significant for coarse grains and vegetable oils (6% and 8%,
respectively). The more drastic changes are mainly due to large
adjustments on the US ethanol and EU biodiesel markets. It is
important to highlight that decreases in world market prices
are generally not fully transmitted to the domestic markets in
all regions of the world, i.e. the decrease of local market prices
is generally less than the decrease of world market prices. An
exception to this is observed for domestic markets in countries
where obligations for biofuel consumptions are binding, such as
in the EU, US and Brazil. In these countries the domestic price
adjustments that follow a removal of biofuel policies are in gen-
eral larger than on the world markets. Our results suggest thatbiofuel mandates cannot be blamed as the only culprit for rising
agricultural prices world-wide. Nonetheless, biofuel policies seem
to play a role in setting up a high-price which is less prompt to
react to market signals. This finding is in line with other studies
generally stressing the impact of biofuel policies on agricultural
commodity price levels (see e.g. Babcock, 2011; Condon et al.,
2015; de Gorter et al., 2013; Gilbert and Mugera, 2014; Zhang
et al., 2013). However, when comparing our results with those
of other studies, it has to be kept in mind that our analysis is for-
ward looking, i.e. we project what would happen if biofuel policies
would be abolished by 2024. Scenario results are partially driven
by exogenous assumptions on macroeconomic developments,
which in our scenarios are the ones taken in the latest OECD-FAO
(2015) agricultural market outlook, assuming e.g. lower levels of
crude oil prices compared to previous outlooks. A different devel-
opment of the exogenous drivers could alter the scenario results
regarding the effects of biofuel policies on agricultural markets
and prices. Moreover, this also implies that from our scenario
results it cannot necessarily be deducted that the impact of biofuel
policies had the same magnitude in the past as in our forward look-
ing analysis, because general market conditions in the past have
not been the same as they are assumed for the future.
Concerning the issue of global food security, it is necessary
to differentiate the impact of biofuel policies on agricultural
price variability and price levels. There is widespread agreement
S.R. Araujo Enciso et al. / Food Policy 61 (2016) 9–26 19that large fluctuations of agricultural commodity prices can be
harmful for both consumers and producers and that they can
have adverse effects on global food security (FAO et al.,
2011a,b; Tangermann, 2011). In this regard, our scenario results
actually indicate that the abolishment of biofuel policies would
only moderately increase price variability for agricultural com-
modities. In contrast to the consensus about the harmful effects
of price fluctuations on food security, it is less clear whether
high prices for agricultural commodities generally threaten food
security, which is due to the ambiguous effects of high prices
on poverty and hunger. Higher prices increase the cost for con-
sumers, but at the same time they also lead to increasing
income of farmers (who represent a major part of the world’s
poor). Therefore the ultimate effect of high agricultural com-
modity prices on food security depends on whether a household
is a net seller or net buyer of agricultural products (see e.g. the
discussions in FAO et al., 2011b; Dorward, 2012; Swinnen and
Squicciarini, 2012; Kavallari et al., 2014). Our scenario results
show that although agricultural commodity price levels
decrease with the removal of biofuel policies, this does not nec-
essarily lead to an increase in global food use. Thus, while the
decrease in prices potentially facilitates the access to food, glo-
bal food use is not really enhanced once the biofuels policies
are abolished. Our analysis shows that total crop production
marginally decreases when biofuel mandates are removed; in
addition crops usage is rather reallocated to feed and industrial
use than to food use. As a consequence, the removal of biofuel
policies only leads to very marginal increases in food use for all
crops.
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Appendix A
A.1. Uncertainty estimation
The uncertainty analysis in Aglink–Cosimo involves the quan-
tification coming from two sources: (i) arable crops yield uncer-
tainty and (ii) macroeconomic indicators uncertainty.
A.2. Arable crops uncertainty
The original methodology developed by Burrell and Nii-
Naate (2013), is aimed at covering mostly weather uncertainty
which is estimated by picking up the deviation between mod-
elled and observed yield normalised using the average; while
their approach provides a reasonable level of uncertainty, in
some cases the distribution of the simulated yield includes
negative values. Following this concern, we decided to calcu-
late the uncertainty by means of an OLS regression and assum-
ing truncated normal distributions on the yield uncertainty as
follows.
In Aglink–Cosimo, yield is modelled as a function of real prices
and a trend which represents technological change assuming a
Cobb–Douglas function of the formLogðYc;r;tÞ¼ aþnYLD;PP Log
PPc;r;t1
nCPCICPCIc;r;t1þð1nCPCIÞCPCIc;r;t
 
þ tr
ð1Þ
where Yc,r,t denotes the yield for the commodity c in region r in
year t, a is the intercept, nY,p is the yield to price elasticity,
Pc,r,t1 is the price of the commodity c in region r in the
year t  1, nCPCI is the own cost of production index elasticity,
CPCIc,r,t and CPCIc,r,t1 is the Cost of Production Index for the com-
modity c in region r in year t and t  1 respectively and tr is a
time trend.
In a first step the yield bYc;r;t  is estimated by OLS using histor-
ical baseline from 1996 to 2014 as follows
LogðbY c;r;tÞ¼ a^þ n^YLD;PP Log PPc;r;t1nCPCICPCIc;r;t1þð1nCPCIÞCPCIc;r;t
 
þ btr
ð2Þ
The own cost of production index elasticities servers for weight-
ing the cost of production index of each calendar year comprising
the marketing year, thus we fix those on the estimation. Then, we
calculate the error term (e^c;r;t) as
e^c;r;t ¼ Yc;r;tbY c;r;t ð3Þ
which is the deviation from the expected value, that is the uncer-
tainty sounding yield. This process is done for a total of 79 crops
variables which represent the major producers of arable crops in
the world.
A key assumption is that the error term (e^c;r;t) is a random vari-
able following a truncated normal probability density function
(PDF) wðl; r; a; b; eÞ which is evaluated by the formula
wðl; r; a; b; eÞ ¼ f ðxÞ ¼
0; if e < a
/ðl;r2 ;eÞ
/ðl;r2 ;bÞ/ðl;r2 ;aÞ ; if a 6 e 6 b
0; if b < 0
8><
>: ð4Þ
With l and r denoting the mean and the variance of the parent
general normal distribution, and a and b specifying the truncation
interval.
The second step consists on building clusters of region by
grouping crops. The criteria for building the clusters is the proxim-
ity on the countries, thus we end up with eight clusters represent-
ing eight geographical areas.
The key assumption if that every crop c in each region r con-
tained in the cluster, the uncertainties are correlated, thus the
truncated multivariate normal PDF, w(l, R, a, b; e), can be written
as
wðl;R;a;b; eÞ ¼
exp  12 ðe lÞTR1ðe lÞ
n o
R b
a exp  12 ðe lÞTR1ðe lÞ
n o
de
ð5Þ
for a 6 e 6 b and 0 otherwise, with R being the covariance matrix.
The third step consists on using replicating n shocks, times v
variables, times y years. In the original methodology proposed by
Burrell and Nii-Naate (2013), the simulation is done using a mul-
tivariate normal distribution with the Latin Hypercube tech-
nique. While they proved that such an option is feasible as the
error term are normally distributed, the simulations in some
cases yield negative error terms, which prompted difficulties as
the equations in the model are in logarithms. Moreover, some
simulations yielded extreme values representing large losses of
yield close to zero which historically have not been observed.
Following those concerns, we decided to do the estimation using
the R package tmvtnorm developed by Wilhelm and Manjunath
(2014) within this package is available the function rtmvnorm,
Fig. 6. Uncertainty evolution over the projection period for the region Oceania.
Table 7
Values for the weighting factor k.
Year of the projection k
1 0.500
2 0.707
3 0.794
4 0.841
5 0.871
6 0.891
7 0.906
8 0.917
9 0.926
10 0.933
20 S.R. Araujo Enciso et al. / Food Policy 61 (2016) 9–26which allows the simulation assuming a truncated multivariate
normal distribution. The truncation is done using as values the
minimum and maximum error terms from the OLS, and using
the Gibbs sampling approach as described in Wilhelm and
Manjunath (2010) and Wilhelm (2014). Fig. 6 shows a compar-
ison of simulated crop yields in the region Oceania. It is assumed
that simulations are time independent. In total we perform 1000
simulations for the 79 variables for the 10 years of the
projection.
A.3. Macroeconomic indicators uncertainty
Our aim is similar to the original methodology developed by
Burrell and Nii-Naate (2013), which is using historical data to pro-
duce estimates of future variation and covariance. We focus our
attention on the exponential weighted moving average (EWMA)
model. Our starting point is calculating the 12-months ahead pro-
jection as follows
uME;r;t ¼ ln MEH;r;tMEB;r;t
 
ð6Þ
Next we need the estimated variation for our sample period, for
which we use the average u2ME;r . The reason for this decision is that
our data represents overall how good or bad the 12-month-ahead
projections are, therefore, rather than projecting the individual
errors in the future, we use the average error which is assumed
to be zero and remains constant in the estimation of future varia-
tion. For the estimated variance, instead of using a moving window
with length m, we use the whole sample. The formula stands as
r2ME;r;tþ1 ¼ kr2ME;r;t þ ð1 kÞu2ME;r ð7ÞConcerning the covariance matrix estimation, the assumption of
a constant error over the projection is assumed such thatRME;t ¼ kRME;t1 þ ð1 kÞðuME  uMEÞ ð8Þ
As for the values of the weighting factor, k, different criteria can
be used. For instance, J.P. Morgan has found that a value of 0.94
gives sensible short-term forecast for daily options, which is a
half-life of 11.2 days. Because the data here is yearly, using the
value proposed by J.P. Morgan would translate into a half-life of
11.2 years, which is outside the 10 years projection time. Setting
the half-life at the middle point of the projection is equivalent to
use the year five or year six. Table 7 shows the k values for the
half-life in every year of the projection.
The EWMA model with k5 = 0.89 provides a smooth and
consistent time increasing variation for our 10-years projection
period. To our knowledge, the selection of the weighting value
Fig. 7. Evolution of the uncertainty aggregated for the macroeconomic indicators in Brazil.
S.R. Araujo Enciso et al. / Food Policy 61 (2016) 9–26 21k is empirical and there is no consensus for its estimation. Some
authors have provided some techniques, for instance Tsay (2011)
provided an R code for estimating k based on optimisation using
different time windows. Zivot and Wang (2007, pp. 484–485)
state that by using the observed likelihood function of the
observed time series, it should be possible to estimate the vec-
tors containing the mean and k using the initial values of the
parameters. Another approach is provided by Spider Financial
(2013), who suggest that the best choice for k is the one that
minimise the residuals between the EWMA and realised volatil-Table 8
Statistics values for the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test applied to biofuel and crops prices
from Figs. 1–3.
Commodity Region p-Values Reject at 5% confidence level
Ethanol Price World 0.00 Yes
US 0.00 Yes
Brazil 0.00 Yes
EU-28 0.00 Yes
India 0.00 Yes
Biodiesel Price World 0.00 Yes
US 0.00 Yes
EU-28 0.00 Yes
Indonesia 0.00 Yes
Argentina 0.06 No
Coarse Grains World 0.00 Yes
Wheat 0.00 Yes
Oilseeds 0.00 Yes
Protein Meals 0.00 Yes
Vegetable Oils 0.00 Yes
Sugar 0.00 Yesity. Finally, Bennett & Fillebeen (2015) provide a set of functions
in the R Package GARPFRM endorsed by the Global Association
of Risk Professionals; their approach is to minimise k calculating
the covariance matrix recursively with different time windows.
All the approaches mentioned before are implemented for finan-
cial data (large number of observations) and rely on recursive
estimation with different windows with m observations, which
is consistent with the original EWMA. The EWMA we are imple-
mented use the whole sample, thus we do not use a window
because our aggregation is constant, thus we cannot implement
those methods in our set-up. Moreover, the estimations require a
large dataset, which is a limitation for us.
Fig. 7 shows an evolution of the projected macroeconomic
uncertainty in Brazil implementing the EWMA approach.
Appendix B. Results from the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test
In order to test if the prices for biofuels and crops are statis-
tically different in both scenarios, we used the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test, the null for this test is that both samples belong
to the same distribution, such that mean and standard devia-
tion are the same, when one of these two measures is different
the null is rejected, nevertheless the test does not provide
information on which measure is different. Table 8 provides
the p-values per test. For the estimation we used the function
ks.test in R.
Appendix C. Main statistics for the variables treated
stochastically in the uncertainty analysis
See Tables 9–11.
Table 9
Statistics for crop yields shocked with exogenous uncertainty, Reference Scenario, values for the year 2024, only simulations which prompt a solution in both scenarios are
included.
Region Country Crop Average (Ton/Ha) Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation (%) 2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile
Asia Indonesia Palm Oila 43,314 5832 13 33,837 55,649
Malaysia Palm Oila 22,601 3321 14 17,392 30,242
Thailand Rice 2.58 0.15 6 2.31 2.85
Sugar Cane 85.76 18.94 22 54.37 126.65
Vietnam Rice 4.50 0.13 3 4.23 4.73
Black Sea Region Kazakhstan Oilseeds 0.69 0.41 52 0.17 1.73
Wheat 1.18 0.54 43 0.33 2.38
Russia Sugar Beet 40.26 14.66 35 16.69 76.01
Sunflower seed 1.41 0.43 30 0.73 2.40
Wheat 2.30 0.53 23 1.32 3.40
Ukraine Coarse Grains 4.33 1.14 26 2.43 6.87
Oilseeds 2.22 0.51 22 1.36 3.35
Wheat 3.75 1.97 48 1.02 8.86
China China Maize 6.50 0.38 6 5.66 7.09
Rice 4.81 0.14 3 4.54 5.06
Sugar Beet 49.51 8.23 17 34.40 66.33
Sugar Cane 71.40 5.49 8 59.78 81.55
Wheat 5.52 0.31 6 4.80 6.00
EU EU-15b Barley 5.19 0.39 8 4.35 5.88
Maize 9.75 1.11 11 7.64 11.97
Oats 5.08 0.51 10 4.02 6.02
Other Cereals 3.61 0.32 9 3.01 4.20
Rapeseed 4.22 0.32 8 3.55 4.79
Rice 3.52 0.38 11 2.71 4.17
Rye 4.80 1.18 25 2.70 7.16
Soft Wheat 3.40 0.61 18 2.27 4.66
Soybean 78.19 7.21 9 63.63 91.34
Sugar Beet 2.09 0.19 9 1.74 2.45
Sunflower seed 3.43 0.58 17 2.26 4.55
Winter Wheat 6.88 0.54 8 5.70 7.79
EU-NMSc Barley 3.83 0.55 14 2.70 4.78
Maize 6.17 2.67 41 2.12 12.26
Oats 3.15 0.48 15 2.17 4.03
Other Cereals 2.59 0.44 17 1.69 3.38
Rapeseed 2.68 0.92 34 1.11 4.64
Rye 2.79 0.52 19 1.75 3.77
Soft Wheat 2.35 1.27 49 0.57 5.32
Soybean 56.35 6.50 12 43.65 68.47
Sugar Beet 2.09 0.62 29 1.11 3.51
Sunflower seed 4.03 1.24 30 1.88 6.68
Winter Wheat 4.32 0.87 20 2.75 5.95
India India Rice 2.86 0.27 9 2.33 3.40
Sugar Cane 69.97 7.18 10 56.37 83.96
Wheat 3.53 0.26 7 3.02 3.99
North America Canada Barley 3.44 0.35 10 2.73 4.08
Maize 9.40 0.64 7 8.04 10.57
Oats 3.15 0.25 8 2.61 3.60
Rapeseed 2.10 0.20 10 1.68 2.49
Soybean 2.95 0.50 17 2.00 3.96
Wheat 3.15 0.33 11 2.49 3.76
Mexico Maize 3.12 0.31 10 2.51 3.70
Wheat 6.12 0.55 9 5.04 7.10
US Maize 11.32 1.56 14 8.52 14.61
Rice 6.33 0.36 6 5.59 6.97
Soybean 3.48 0.40 11 2.75 4.34
Sugar Beet 62.24 7.53 12 47.74 76.73
Sugar Cane 82.88 9.18 11 65.44 102.00
Wheat 3.31 0.38 12 2.57 4.16
Oceania Australia Barley 2.21 0.70 32 0.86 3.43
Milk 6.76 0.35 5 6.11 7.50
Rapeseed 1.59 0.57 36 0.57 2.71
Sugar Cane 92.93 11.40 12 70.36 112.53
Wheat 1.93 0.68 35 0.70 3.15
New Zealand Milk 4.48 0.33 7 3.80 5.04
South America Argentina Barley 3.79 0.91 24 2.05 5.42
Maize 6.87 1.28 18 4.88 9.81
Soybean 2.84 0.59 21 1.77 4.07
Sugar Cane 75.89 10.61 14 55.48 97.14
Sunflower seed 2.03 0.30 14 1.52 2.65
Wheat 3.37 0.66 19 2.22 4.74
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Table 9 (continued)
Region Country Crop Average (Ton/Ha) Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation (%) 2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile
Brazil Maize 5.35 0.71 13 4.01 6.71
Soybean 3.16 0.40 13 2.42 3.98
Sugar Cane 76.95 3.40 4 69.91 83.45
Wheat 2.98 0.76 25 1.72 4.65
Paraguay Coarse Grains 3.83 0.97 25 2.21 5.98
Oilseeds 2.75 0.88 31 1.39 4.90
Wheat 2.47 1.16 43 0.74 5.30
Uruguay Coarse Grains 4.11 0.77 19 2.53 5.54
Wheat 3.66 1.85 45 1.03 8.15
a Palm Oil in Indonesia and Malaysia is shocked on the production, values are in Mn tonnes.
b EU-15 is the aggregate of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom.
c EU-NMS is the aggregate of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Table 10
Statistics for crop yields shocked with exogenous uncertainty, No Biofuel Policy Scenario, values for the year 2024, range 5–95th percentile, only simulations which prompt a
solution in both scenarios are included.
Region Country Crop Average (Ton/Ha) Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation (%) Minimum Maximum
Asia Indonesia Palm Oila 41,063 5737 14 31,702 53,400
Malaysia Palm Oila 21,450 3231 15 16,278 28,575
Thailand Rice 2.58 0.14 6 2.31 2.85
Sugar Cane 85.67 18.92 22 54.34 126.63
Vietnam Rice 4.50 0.13 3 4.22 4.73
Black Sea Region Kazakhstan Oilseeds 0.69 0.41 52 0.17 1.73
Wheat 1.18 0.54 43 0.33 2.38
Russia Sugar Beet 40.23 14.65 35 16.70 76.00
Sunflower seed 1.41 0.43 30 0.73 2.39
Wheat 2.29 0.53 23 1.32 3.39
Ukraine Coarse Grains 4.32 1.13 26 2.43 6.85
Oilseeds 2.22 0.50 22 1.36 3.35
Wheat 3.74 1.97 48 1.02 8.85
China China Maize 6.47 0.38 6 5.62 7.06
Rice 4.81 0.14 3 4.53 5.06
Sugar Beet 49.47 8.23 17 34.36 66.27
Sugar Cane 71.36 5.49 8 59.75 81.58
Wheat 5.50 0.30 6 4.78 5.99
EU EU-15b Barley 5.17 0.39 8 4.34 5.86
Maize 9.71 1.11 11 7.61 11.92
Oats 5.07 0.51 10 4.01 6.00
Other Cereals 3.61 0.32 9 3.00 4.19
Rapeseed 4.21 0.32 8 3.54 4.78
Rice 3.48 0.37 11 2.69 4.12
Rye 4.78 1.17 25 2.69 7.12
Soft Wheat 3.40 0.60 18 2.27 4.65
Soybean 78.14 7.21 9 63.55 91.27
Sugar Beet 2.09 0.18 9 1.73 2.44
Sunflower seed 3.43 0.58 17 2.25 4.53
Winter Wheat 6.87 0.54 8 5.69 7.77
EU-NMSc Barley 3.82 0.55 14 2.69 4.76
Maize 6.15 2.66 41 2.11 12.22
Oats 3.14 0.48 15 2.16 4.02
Other Cereals 2.58 0.44 17 1.69 3.37
Rapeseed 2.66 0.91 34 1.11 4.61
Rye 2.78 0.52 19 1.74 3.75
Soft Wheat 2.35 1.27 49 0.57 5.31
Soybean 56.30 6.50 12 43.65 68.34
Sugar Beet 2.09 0.62 29 1.11 3.50
Sunflower seed 4.01 1.24 30 1.87 6.65
Winter Wheat 4.31 0.87 20 2.74 5.94
India India Rice 2.86 0.27 9 2.33 3.39
Sugar Cane 69.91 7.18 10 56.29 83.87
Wheat 3.53 0.26 7 3.01 3.99
North America Canada Barley 3.44 0.35 10 2.73 4.08
Maize 9.40 0.64 7 8.04 10.57
Oats 3.15 0.25 8 2.61 3.60
Rapeseed 2.10 0.20 10 1.68 2.49
Soybean 2.95 0.50 17 2.00 3.96
Wheat 3.15 0.33 11 2.49 3.76
Mexico Maize 3.09 0.31 10 2.48 3.67
Wheat 6.09 0.55 9 5.02 7.08
(continued on next page)
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Table 10 (continued)
Region Country Crop Average (Ton/Ha) Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation (%) Minimum Maximum
US Maize 11.28 1.55 14 8.48 14.57
Rice 6.33 0.36 6 5.59 6.97
Soybean 3.48 0.40 11 2.75 4.33
Sugar Beet 61.91 7.50 12 47.47 76.38
Sugar Cane 82.27 9.12 11 65.15 101.09
Wheat 3.31 0.38 12 2.57 4.16
Oceania Australia Barley 2.21 0.70 32 0.86 3.43
Milk 6.76 0.35 5 6.11 7.50
Rapeseed 1.59 0.57 36 0.57 2.70
Sugar Cane 92.86 11.40 12 70.27 112.51
Wheat 1.92 0.67 35 0.70 3.14
New Zealand Milk 4.48 0.33 7 3.79 5.04
South America Argentina Barley 3.79 0.90 24 2.04 5.41
Maize 6.82 1.28 18 4.85 9.74
Soybean 2.83 0.59 21 1.76 4.07
Sugar Cane 75.62 10.58 14 55.23 96.95
Sunflower seed 2.03 0.30 14 1.52 2.65
Wheat 3.36 0.65 19 2.21 4.73
Brazil Maize 5.33 0.71 13 3.99 6.69
Soybean 3.15 0.40 12 2.42 3.98
Sugar Cane 76.27 3.50 5 69.18 83.01
Wheat 2.95 0.75 25 1.70 4.61
Paraguay Coarse Grains 3.82 0.97 25 2.20 5.96
Oilseeds 2.75 0.88 31 1.38 4.89
Wheat 2.47 1.15 43 0.74 5.29
Uruguay Coarse Grains 4.10 0.77 19 2.52 5.52
Wheat 3.66 1.85 45 1.03 8.14
a Palm Oil in Indonesia and Malaysia is shocked on the production, values are in Mn tonnes.
b EU-15 is the aggregate of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom.
c EU-NMS is the aggregate of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Table 11
Statistics for macroeconomic variables shocked with exogenous uncertainty, values for the year 2024, range 5–95th percentile, only simulations which prompt a solution in both
scenarios are included.
Country Variable Average Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation (%) Minimum Maximum
Japan CPI 1.22 0.05 4.40 1.12 1.33
GDPD 1.19 0.06 5.31 1.06 1.33
GDPI 1.14 0.11 10.03 0.93 1.38
XR 0.12 0.02 18.48 0.07 0.17
Russia CPI 1.99 0.32 16.31 1.33 2.65
GDPD 2.16 0.53 24.49 1.10 3.25
GDPI 1.43 0.26 18.13 0.91 1.99
XR 45.11 7.70 17.07 28.84 61.20
China CPI 1.46 0.18 12.15 1.10 1.84
GDPD 1.40 0.34 24.52 0.69 2.06
GDPI 2.29 0.26 11.26 1.74 2.81
XR 6.53 0.45 6.85 5.61 7.40
EU-15 CPI 1.29 0.05 4.06 1.18 1.40
GDPD 1.27 0.08 6.07 1.10 1.43
GDPI 1.21 0.08 6.43 1.05 1.37
EU-28 XR 0.87 0.12 14.10 0.62 1.12
Canada CPI 1.33 0.05 3.63 1.22 1.42
GDPD 1.33 0.07 5.25 1.19 1.48
GDPI 1.36 0.07 5.43 1.21 1.51
XR 1.28 0.15 11.70 1.00 1.59
US CPI 1.29 0.04 2.96 1.21 1.37
GDPD 1.30 0.07 5.61 1.15 1.46
GDPI 1.42 0.08 5.69 1.26 1.59
Australia CPI 1.44 0.08 5.24 1.28 1.59
GDPD 1.35 0.12 8.71 1.10 1.59
GDPI 1.56 0.05 3.01 1.46 1.66
XR 1.49 0.28 18.74 0.90 2.07
New Zealand CPI 1.27 0.09 6.71 1.09 1.45
GDPD 1.28 0.08 6.04 1.12 1.44
GDPI 1.42 0.08 5.71 1.26 1.59
XR 1.59 0.29 18.22 0.99 2.17
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Table 11 (continued)
Country Variable Average Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation (%) Minimum Maximum
Brazil CPI 2.11 0.35 16.39 1.42 2.80
GDPD 2.03 0.27 13.43 1.49 2.63
GDPI 1.35 0.13 9.79 1.06 1.61
XR 3.93 1.09 27.81 1.68 6.13
World Oil 88.01 17.60 19.99 50.94 124.12
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